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During the 1980s, the proportion of business assets financed by
debt exceeded that of any other period since World War II. Although
much of this leverage accommodated new investment, during the last
half of the decade corporations also replaced more than one-sixth of
their outstanding stock with debt securities. Because of this surge in
leverage, many analysts and policymakers are wary that businesses may
have become too vulnerable, perhaps imperiling prospects for capital
formation and employment opportunities.
As the financial structure of businesses changed during the past
decade, the characteristics of financial securities also changed. Junk
bonds, variants of preferred stock, yield enhancements, warrants, and
other forms of mezzanine financing became more common in credit
markets and in private loan contracts. Furthermore, the potential risks
and returns offered by all securities have been altered as otherwise
familiar financial instruments increasingly contain novel options (puts,
indexed terms, resets, auctions, caps) and as derivative securities and
various swap agreements are accepted as standard financial instru-
ments.
These innovations have challenged the traditional financial and
legal distinctions between debt and equity. Accordingly, public policy
may need to adapt along with financial relationships, because income
tax laws, regulations governing financial institutions, corporation law,
and definitions of the legal rights and responsibilities of an enterprise’s
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owners or creditors depend on clear boundaries to separate classes of
creditors and equityholders. For example, if varieties of debt and equity
instruments are more commonly regarded merely as alternative meth-
ods of financing businesses, both the bankruptcy law’s distinctions
among stakeholders and the income tax law’s traditional distinction
between interest payments (an expense) and profits (taxable income)
may need to be amended. Similarly, many of the laws, regulations, and
conventions that encourage financial intermediaries to hold debt rather
than equity may require revision. Whether these distinctions account for
the recent increase in leverage or not, if policymakers regard leverage as
excessive, reforms of the appropriate laws and regulations could foster
equity financing.
In the fall of 1989 the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston sponsored this
conference to examine the changes in business financing, why these
changes have occurred, and the implications of these changes for public
policy. In general, the participants observed that no simple theory
explains fully the recent trends in business finance. For example, tax
laws alone do not determine a corporation’s capital structure. A satis-
factory explanation might also depend on agency costs, objectives of
stakeholders, the importance of corporate control, financial regulations,
the relative cost of funds, and the dynamic strategies of management.
Consequently, an attempt to reduce leverage through a simple reform of
tax law, financial regulations, or bankruptcy law may not succeed. Even
if it were successful, the cost of reforming policy could exceed its
benefits, especially if other objectives of these policies were compro-
mised in order to regulate leverage. Many participants also questioned
the threat posed by the recent surge in debt financing. Some thought
that the trend toward greater leverage has run its course, and equity
financing will become more prevalent.
The conference comprises three sections. The first section surveys
the financial and legal theories concerning an enterprise’s choice of
capital structure. The financial survey concludes that a promising
financial theory is more likely to describe the optimal form of financial
contracts, rather than confining itself to determining the optimal degree
of leverage. The fundamental innovation is the recent change in the
characteristics of contracts, rather than a simple increase in leverage.
The legal survey finds that, for solvent corporations, the distinction
between the rights of creditors and those of shareholders is sharp. But
for insolvent corporations the rights of various stakeholders are often
negotiable, and this in time may erode the distinctions between the
discrete contracts of debt instruments and the relational contracts of
equity instruments.
The second section discusses the practical motives of savers and
investors that might account for the recent increase in leverage. Corpo-AN OVERVIEW 3
rations have demonstrated a preference for financing their assets with
their own cash flow, and if external financing is necessary they favor
debt over equity. Accordingly, a corporation has no fixed target for its
leverage; when opportunities to expand assets are sufficiently inviting
and when the cost of debt financing is relatively attractive, leverage will
tend to increase. While the inclination to supply more debt has in-
creased during the current economic recovery, the demand for debt
instruments also may have increased as regulations and accounting
conventions encouraged pension funds to match their assets to their
sponsors’ liabilities. Nevertheless, the substantial retirement of equity
during the past five years remains a novel puzzle.
The last section examines the influence of income tax laws and
financial regulations on leverage. Although the tax law encourages
corporations to rely on debt financing, neither the timing nor the
magnitude of recent changes in the tax law can explain the surge in debt
financing. Popular proposals for reforming the tax code in order to
remove this bias in favor of debt financing would either reduce revenues
considerably or introduce new distortions into the income tax. Because
the effects of tax laws on corporate financial decisions are poorly
understood, conducting financial regulation through these laws may be
costly. Instead, minimum capital requirements may be applied directly
to corporations. In addition, the regulations that strongly encourage
banking institutions and other financial intermediaries to hold debt
rather than equity may be relaxed. Although these regulations were
intended to make these intermediaries and the economy more stable,
they can foster risky investments, making the economy less stable.
Acordingly, the benefit from reforming financial regulations may be
relatively great.
The Changing Nature of Debt and Equity
Why do businesses rely so greatly on debt financing? Why are debt
instruments including more equity features? While biases in the income
tax code are important determinants of capital structure, the first two
sessions discuss other explanations. The participants in these sessions
agree that new views of financial instruments are becoming necessary as
debt and equity contracts become less distinct. The members of the
finance sessions examine the economic incentives for issuing a spectrum
of securities, while those of the legal session discuss the rights and
responsibilities of the investors who hold these securities.4 Richard W. Kopcke and Eric S. Rosengren
A Financial Perspective
Franklin Allen, of the University of Pennsylvania, introduces sev-
eral themes discussed throughout the conference: that financial innova-
tion has introduced hybrid securities blending the characteristics of debt
and equity, that the characteristics of these securities are not determined
by tax laws alone, and that the incentives of stakeholders may better
explain firms’ financial structures. Financial theories focusing on tax
burdens, the cost of bankruptcy, or asymmetric information among
stakeholders do not explain either the rapid introduction of hybrid
securities or the significant changes in leverage over the past ten years.
The recent introduction of many hybrid securities suggests that
financial theories defining optimal ratios of debt to equity are not as
promising as those describing the optimal forms of securities. The
diverse interests of heterogeneous stakeholders might be satisfied best
by a variety of financial instruments. In the case of public corporations,
pure debt and equity contracts are not necessarily best suited to the
interests of management and the various providers of external fi- ¯
nancing. The optimal payments to "creditors" might depend on the
performance of the corporation, and the optimal division of voting
rights need not allow one vote per share and majority rule. Further-
more, the spectrum of securities that might best meet the needs of
corporate stakeholders might not ensure efficient capital markets and,
therefore, might not be optimal from a social point of view.
Oliver D. Hart, from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
contends that the theory regarding the control of assets is more robust
than Allen suggests. The major attribute of equity, according to Hart, is
ownership. Owners of an asset not only hold a residual claim on its
returns but also choose how to employ that asset. Even without
differences in the tastes of stakeholders or difficulties in verifying a
firm’s performance, for example, equityholders differ from creditors
because of their ability to control the enterprise.
Robert C. Merton, from the Harvard Business School, suggests that
promising theories regarding the choice of capital structure appear not
to depend on the demands of investors. Because investors are con-
cerned with the risk of their portfolios rather than the risk of particular
securities, firms need not issue a variety of securities, since intermedi-
aries could repackage the financial claims issued by firms to create
portfolios that are most appealing to investors. For example, if firms
issued equity only, financial intermediaries could acquire these equities
and issue the appropriate spectrum of securities backed by the firms’
assets. In this case, the operation of the firms would be insulated from
any defaults that might occur on "their" financial liabilities.AN OVERVIEW
A Legal Perspective
Charles P. Normandin, from the Boston law firm of Ropes & Gray,
observes that the traditional legal distinctions between the rights and
responsibilities of shareholders and those of creditors have been
strained. Management possesses broad fiduciary responsibilities that
provide it with substantial discretion to operate the business in the best
interest of shareholders. For solvent firms, the relationship of manage-
ment to creditors is contractual, providing specific responsibilities de-
fined by loan agreements. Despite challenges claiming that manage-
ment’s fiduciary responsibility should be extended to creditors, recent
judgments have found that creditors cannot expect the courts to
intervene in their contracts. Considerable problems may arise as firms
seek financing from different sources at different times, but creditors
must either protect themselves through appropriate contractual commit-
ments or refuse to supply funding.
The insolvent corporation and its management owe fiduciary duties
to the various classes of creditors as well as to stockholders, but the law
gives only vague guidance for balancing these often incompatible
responsibilities. In such cases, the classification of claimants will become
more difficult, and the legal rules governing the concessions among
claimants may become too restrictive to achieve an acceptable reorgani-
zation. Consequently, the traditional distinctions among stakeholders
may blur, as the courts try to cope with financial innovations.
Robert E. Scott, from the University of Virginia School of Law,
disagrees with Normandin’s view that firms have a voluntary contrac-
tual agreement with creditors and a fiduciary responsibility to share-
holders. Instead, the firm’s relation with both creditors and sharehold-
ers is contractual. Two different contracts can apply to the firm. Discrete
contracts provide detailed specifications that standardize the contract
and simplify the monitoring of the contractual relation. Relational
contracts are used when the uncertainty and complexity of the relation-
ship prevent all contingencies from being specified, requiring a more
general contractual commitment. While debt has been considered a
discrete contract and equity a relational contract, these designations are
being eroded by financial innovations. As debt instruments include
characteristics of equity, they too must be considered relational con-
tracts. When courts interpret these contracts they should promote
value-maximizing transactions.
Richard T. Peters, a partner in the Los Angeles law firm of Sidley &
Austin, discusses the legal uncertainty surrounding the distinctions
between debt and equity. Future litigation will focus on the standing of
debt and hybrid securities used in highly leveraged transactions when a
firm declares bankruptcy. Since many of these securities could beRichard IV. Kopcke and Eric S. Rosengren
considered substitutes for existing capital, they may not be treated as
traditional debt instruments in corporate reorganizations. Until the
courts decide more cases involving leveraged buyouts, particularly how
the instruments issued in leveraged buyouts are classified in a reorga-
nization and how voting power and responsibilities of management
should be allocated among the different classes of creditors, negotiating
reorganizations will remain difficult.
Why Debt and Equity Have Changed
Why are businesses now relying on debt financing more than in the
past? The next two sessions discuss the motives of businesses and
institutional investors that may account for this surge in leverage. The
first session examines the firm’s motivations for issuing debt, discussing
the influence of external financing and conflicts among stakeholders on
a firm’s choice of capital structure. The second session discusses how
the goals, traditions, and regulations governing pension funds may
have increased the demand for debt relative to that for equity.
The Firm’s View of Debt and Equity
Stewart C. Myers, from the Sloan School of Management at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, surveys the evidence for three
theories of capital structure: the trade-off theory, the pecking order
theory, and the organizational theory, and concludes that some combi-
nation of the pecking order theory and the organizational theory best fits
recent trends in capital structure.
The trade-off theory contends that firms issue debt until the value of
the tax shield on debt equals the expected costs of bankruptcy. Myers
observes that this simple model cannot explain two empirical regulari-
ties. First, stock prices rise for firms announcing actions that will
increase their leverage, while stock prices fall for firms announcing
actions that will reduce their leverage. The trade-off theory predicts that
stock prices should increase with any change in leverage, because
managers should always be approaching, rather than retreating from,
the optimal capital structure. Second, the most profitable firms in an
industry borrow less. The trade-off theory predicts that they should
borrow more, because firms with higher profits have more taxable
income to shield by issuing debt.
The pecking order theory is not consistent with a static optimal
capital structure. Firms prefer internal to external financing, and if
external financing is necessary they prefer debt to equity. Managers will
never issue shares when the firm is undervalued; knowing this, inves-AN OVERVIEW
tors will always view a new equity issue as bad news. The pecking order
theory predicts that the issuing of new equity is bad news, while the
retirement of equity is good news. It also predicts that profitable firms
will tend to have low leverage.
The organizational theory assumes that management maximizes
assets under its control rather than shareholders’ wealth. Accordingly,
management maximizes the value of equity and employee surplus,
which includes perks, overstaffing, and above-market wages. Issuing
new debt is good news, because it increases the value of the tax shield
while diminishing employee surplus by increasing the burden of inter-
est payments. Management prefers to rely on internal financing, so
more profitable firms will have lower leverage. Myers believes that the
pecking order theory and the organizational theory explain patterns of
corporate finance better than the trade-off theory, and that a promising
theory of corporate finance would appear to require more study of the
conflicts between management and investors.
O. Leonard Darling, of Baring America, predicts that most compa-
nies will be reducing their debt. Lower leverage is necessary because the
costs of financial distress now exceed the benefit of debt’s tax shield for
many firms. Reducing leverage will tend to create conflicts among
management, shareholders, and creditors, and each firm’s strategy for
reducing leverage will depend on whether the firm is privately or
publicly held. Publicly held companies will adopt strategies that main-
tain the value of equity in order to deter hostile takeovers. Privately held
companies may be more willing to force transfers from creditors to
equityholders by threatening creditors with bankruptcy.
Robert A. Taggart, Jr., from Boston College, contends that the
recent increase in corporations’ leverage at a time when internal funds
were plentiful poses a problem for most traditional theories of finance.
The surge in debt financing was used to retire outstanding equity, a fact
that neither the trade-off theory nor the pecking order theory can
explain adequately. Although the organizational theory might comple-
ment the pecking order theory to explain this change in capital struc-
ture, the organizational theory needs further development in order that
we may understand better how shareholders’ valuations can influence
managers’ behavior.
The Lender’s View of Debt and Equity
Zvi Bodie, from the Boston University School of Management,
contends that recent financial innovation can be attributed partly to
changes in the demand for securities by lenders. He illustrates this
argument by discussing how regulations and accounting requirements
have influenced the recent behavior of the pension fund industry.Richard W. Kopcke and Eric S. Rosengren
The investment policies of pension funds, which hold 25 percent of
outstanding common stock and 39 percent of outstanding corporate
bonds, are guided by government regulations and sponsors’ needs to
meet their obligations to their plans’ beneficiaries. Regulations and
accounting conventions increasingly have encouraged pension funds to
"immunize" their portfolios by matching their assets to their sponsors’
liabilities. This demand has fostered the development of derivative
securities such as index options and futures contracts. It has also
encouraged pension funds to hold fixed-income securities whose dura-
tion matches that of their liabilities more closely than do the durations of
stock or floating-rate bonds. Thus, both the increase in leverage and the
introduction of new securities can be attributed partly to the demands of
investors such as pension funds.
Peter L. Bernstein, from Peter L. Bernstein, Inc., is skeptical that the
recent increase in corporate leverage might be explained by pension
funds’ needs to run a matched book. Pension funds, like the many other
investors who purchased debt, were attracted by the high real returns
on debt available in the early 1980s. Pension funds purchased much of
the corporate debt even though these securities were not as appropriate
as government debt for immunization strategies because government
debt, unlike corporate debt, cannot be called when interest rates fall. To
a degree, the pension funds’ demand for corporate debt was fostered by
the equity features of these securities.
Benjamin M. Friedman, from Harvard University, also is not con-
vinced that hedging by investors such as pension funds could explain the
increase in corporate leverage. While pensions may wish to hedge their
liabilities, derivatives of government securities would be more suitable than
corporate debt. Junk bonds, the fastest growing component of corporate
debt, are not appropriate for hedging because of their relatively short
durations and because of their substantial risk of deferred repayments,
diminished repayments, conversion to equity, or outright default.
Implications for Public Policy
The final two sessions examine the effects of public policies on the
capital structure of businesses. The first session considers whether the
recent reforms of the income tax code encouraged businesses to rely on
debt financing more than they had in the past. This session also
discusses the potential problems of using the tax codes to regulate the
capital structures of businesses. The second session considers how the
regulation of financial intermediaries, such as banks, fosters debt
financing. This session also discusses whether new banking regulations
might promote more equity financing without necessarily making finan-
cial intermediaries less secure.AN OVERVIEW
Taxation of Debt and Equity
Alan J. Auerbach, from the University of Pennsylvania, questions
the importance of taxation in explaining the recent increase in leverage.
Neither the timing nor the magnitude of tax changes can account for
nonfinancial corporations’ recent reliance on debt. The recent revisions
of the tax law have had mixed effects; for some investors the relative
advantage of holding debt has increased, for others equity has become
more attractive.
Although changes in the tax law are not clearly responsible for the
recent increase in leverage, for decades the tax law has encouraged firms
to rely on debt financing, by imposing a lower tax burden on corporate
assets financed by debt than that imposed on assets financed by equity.
Auerbach considers several proposals that either would integrate cor-
porate and personal taxes or would tax corporations on their cash flow.
These proposals entail a large loss of tax revenues or introduce new
complications and distortions into the tax code. Given the uncertainty
about the causes and costs of increased leverage, it is not clear that the
benefits of these tax changes would exceed their costs.
David F. Bradford, from Princeton University, reemphasizes that
the effects of tax laws on corporate financial decisions are still poorly
understood. For example, why do corporations pay dividends rather
than repurchase their stock given that stock repurchases would increase
most shareholders’ net returns? Until we better understand the effects of
taxation, we should be very cautious about using the tax code to regulate
business capital structures.
Emil M. Sunley, from Deloitte Haskins & Sells, agrees that changes
in tax laws do not explain the increase in corporate borrowing and that
the social costs of increased leverage may have been overstated. He also
is skeptical of proposals to eliminate the tax bias favoring income
accruing to corporate assets financed by debt. Integration of corporate
and individual taxes would redistribute tax burdens unevenly across
industries and across firms within industries. Furthermore, some tech-
nical problems with integration remain unresolved, such as the proper
treatment of holding companies or multiple classes of stock. Cash flow
taxes also have problems concerning the proper treatment of invest-
ments and debt undertaken before the tax reform and the proper
division of tax revenues between the United States and countries that
tax corporate income.
Regulation of Debt and Equity
Richard W. Kopcke and Eric S. Rosengren, from the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, contend that the regulation of financial inter-10 Richard W. Kopcke and Eric S. Rosengren
mediaries can affect corporate capital structure. Household portfolios
have been shifting from equity toward the liabilities of financial inter-
mediaries. In turn, the assets of these intermediaries are invested mostly
in debt instruments. Consequently, this shift in household portfolios
has tended to increase the supply price of equity financing relative to
that of debt.
This bias in favor of debt financing may be attributed partly to the
regulations that govern financial intermediaries. While "deposit insur-
ance," explicit or implied, attracted households’ funds, government
regulations had not allowed intermediaries such as banks and insurance
companies to purchase equities. Contracts governing pension funds’
investments also constrained their holding equities, to a degree. Al-
though these regulations were intended to make intermediaries, finan-
cial markets, and the economy more stable and secure, they might foster
relatively risky investments. Instead of restricting the assets that inter-
mediaries may purchase, often favoring debt over equity, regulations
should control risk by enforcing substantial minimum capital require-
ments, to be funded by common stock.
Ben S. Bernanke, from Princeton University, is skeptical that savers’
preferences could explain the increase in leverage over the past twenty
years. He notes that pension funds, the fastest growing intermediary,
hold a larger share of their assets in equity than do households. The
decisions of firms, rather than those of investors, would appear to be
responsible for the recent increase in leverage. Although the motivation
for financial regulation is weak, he agrees that such regulation should
emphasize capital requirements rather than asset restrictions.
Albert M. Wojnilower, from The First Boston Corporation, criticizes
the recommendation that asset restrictions be reduced. Allowing depos-
itory institutions to hold equity and requiring them to value their assets
using current market prices would destabilize the financial system. He
agrees that binding capital requirements would make the economy more
stable. Moreover, extending capital requirements to large nonfinancial
corporations would reduce the systemic risk stemming from the failure
of highly leveraged businesses. Violation of these requirements could
entail a loss of tax benefits on excessive debt and, potentially, the
dismissal of senior management.
Conclusion
During the past decade firms have significantly increased their
reliance on debt that frequently possesses some of the features of equity.
Although the prevailing income tax laws have encouraged firms to issueAN OVERVIEW 11
debt, the timing and magnitude of the changes in leverage do not
coincide with changes in the tax code.
Many of the conference participants discussed how the conflicting
interests of diverse stakeholders may have encouraged the recent
increase in corporate leverage. For example, disagreements among
investors, management, and employees regarding the control and use of
assets increasingly result in takeovers financed substantially with debt.
Several participants emphasized the importance of financial inter-
mediaries for financing business investments. Intermediaries issue lia-
bilities that are most appealing to savers, using the proceeds to purchase
the securities issued by businesses. As intermediaries have become
more important, binding financial regulations, which generally re-
stricted their ability to purchase equity, may have fostered greater
leverage by increasing the relative supply price of equity.
Participants agreed that traditional distinctions between debt and
equity will be challenged by the introduction of new hybrid securities.
Legal, tax, and regulatory policies, which may have fostered these
financial innovations, must themselves change in order to cope with
emerging patterns of business financing. Promising revisions of public
policy would foster financial contracts that minimize the social costs of
resolving conflicts among a business’s stakeholders, while promoting a
relatively efficient and stable flow of resources from savers to investors.